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IV

JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) and

Pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(4), this matter was assigned to the Utah Court of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3)0.

Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated May 3, 2006, and effective May
23, 2006.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL

1.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined that the defendants'

transaction of business in Utah concerning the contracts that they conspired to interfere
with could not support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over them?
Standard of Review: "Where a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been
made on documentary evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Mach., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v.
American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah
1990)).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined that the defendants'

tortious conduct in Missouri, which was intended to cause injury to Pohl in Utah, and
which caused a party in direct privity with Pohl to send a letter to Pohl in Utah
terminating Pohl's contract, could not support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them?
Standard of Review: "Where a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been
made on documentary evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial
1

Woodworking Mac/7., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v.
American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah
1990)).
3.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it found that there was no basis for

personal jurisdiction over defendants under a conspiracy theory because the
conspirators' acts, in Missouri, only caused a contracting party to send a letter into Utah
terminating Pohl's contract with that party, and the tortious conduct of the defendants,
themselves, occurred only within Missouri?
Standard of Review: "Where a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been
made on documentary evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Mach., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v.
American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah
1990)).
4.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it held that defendants lacked the

minimum contacts with Utah required to satisfy the due process requirements of
specific personal jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: "Where a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been
made on documentary evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Mach., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v.
American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah
1990)).
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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-22.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Purpose of provision.
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that
the public interest demands the state provide its citizens with an
effective means of redress against nonresident persons, who,
through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This
legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological
progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce
between the several states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-23.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Definitions. As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm,
company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state"
mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses
within the state of Utah.
UTAH CODE ANN. §

78-27-24.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting person to
jurisdiction. Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out
of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
3

(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure
from the state; or the commission in this state of the act giving rise
to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to
act, or occurrence over which the defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to
determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for
child support.
UTAH CODE ANN. §

78-27-26.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Only claims arising from
enumerated acts may be asserted. Only claims arising from acts
enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an
action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this act.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves defendants' deliberate interference with a contract between
a Utah corporation, Pohl,1 and a Missouri corporation, T.A.B. Company, Inc. ("TAB.").
In its simplest terms, Pohl and T.A.B. entered into a contract pursuant to which Pohl
was to sell and T.A.B. was to purchase a Pohl Euro-panel system, specifically designed

1

Pohl's business is the design and manufacture of custom-made Euro-panel
systems which are designed to fit on various buildings. Pohl's custom-made Europanel systems are used in construction projects through the country.
4

to fit on a building being built in St. Louis, Missouri. That contract required that Pohl
design and manufacture a Euro-panel system in accordance with specifications
prepared by the architect for the building, Wischmeyer Architects. Because Pohl is
located in Utah, it was known and understood that Pohl would be designing and
manufacturing the Euro-panel system in Utah. Further, T.A.B. was to pay Pohl at its
office in Salt Lake County, Utah. T.A.B. also applied for credit terms with Pohl and
entered into a credit agreement with credit terms of net 30 days, and T.A.B. agreed that
jurisdiction was proper in Utah.
As a subcontractor on the construction project, T.A.B. had a subcontract directly
with the prime contractor KCI Construction Company ("KCI"), a St. Louis general
contractor and the prime contractor for the building. Ronald J. Webelhuth
("Webelhuth") was KCI's project manager. T.A.B. also had a subcontract agreement
with defendant Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc. ("ISME"), another St. Louis
contractor, which was to install the Pohl Euro-panel system after delivery. Defendant
Bret Miller ("Bret") was ISME's project manager, and is the son of ISME's owner,
defendant Dennis Miller.
The specifications for the prime contract to build the St. Louis Performing Arts
Center required that a Pohl Euro-panel system be installed on the exterior of the
building. Bret and ISME, knowing such specification before the prime contract was
even bid, contacted Pohl in Utah to procure a quote for the Euro-panel system. Pohl
supplied the requested quote. Bret and ISME, desiring to make their own position more
attractive to KCI as a prime contract bidder, solicited T.A.B. to submit a bid to KCI, to be
included in its bid.

T.A.B.'s involvement made ISME's involvement more attractive

than a bid from ISME because T.A.B.'s principal, Anetta Vickers, is a minority woman,
5

and T.A.B.'s involvement would help KCI meet minority and women quota requirements
for the project. Bret and ISME therefore guided T.A.B. through the process of entering
into its own contract with Pohl. ISME then entered a contract with T.A.B. to act as
T.A.B.'s project manager and, among other things, to install the Pohl Euro-panel
system.
When Webelhuth prepared KCI's bid for the prime contract, he did so based on
T.A.B.'s bid, which included the Pohl quote to fabricate the Pohl Euro-panel system.
Webelhuth thus represented to the owner that Pohl would be hired to supply the Pohl
Euro-panel system required by the owner's specifications. KCI ultimately received the
award from the owner and thereby assumed contractual responsibility to engage Pohl,
through T.A.B., to supply the specified Pohl Euro-panel system.
Most contacts with Pohl with respect to supplying the Pohl Euro-panel system
under its contract with T.A.B. were ostensibly with Bret and ISME. However,
Webelhuth communicated with Pohl, in Utah, by using Bret and ISME to communicate
with Pohl on his behalf in connection with, and after Pohl had submitted, its quote to
Bret and ISME.
Pohl repeatedly warned T.A.B., Bret and ISME that Pohl would require a
substantial lead-time between verifying field dimensions and delivery of panels. Pohl
also warned T.A.B., Bret and ISME about its available production windows.
T.A.B. was not a licensed contractor and had no familiarity with the specialized
"dry" panel system that was the Pohl Euro-panel system, or the requirements to
fabricate it. Bret also had no understanding of the Euro-panel system and never fully
understood why the Euro-panel system could not be produced on short-notice and,
therefore, never fully understood why Pohl required a substantial lead time between
6

verifying field dimensions and delivery of the Euro-panel system. Moreover,
Webelhuth took no steps to learn about the system, even though he had included
Pohl's quote in KCI's bid, and even though KCI was thus contractually bound to provide
the Pohl Euro-panel system for the project.
In late 2002 and early 2003, the owner was asking questions about when the
Pohl panels would be delivered. By early February, it became clear to Webelhuth that
his own failure to become knowledgeable about the system he had bid to the owner,
and his reliance on Bret and ISME, who also had limited knowledge, had placed KCI in
a perilous position in its contractual obligation with the owner. The Owner wanted
delivery and installation on a timetable with which Webelhuth now belatedly realized he
could not comply, thus jeopardizing KCI's relationship with the owner. To resolve this
problem and to save face with the owner, the conspirators agreed that they would sell
the owner on the idea of changing the prime contract specifications and substituting an
inferior "wet" panel system for the Pohl Euro-panel system. In furtherance of their
conspiracy, the conspirators agreed to divert blame for their failures in managing the
project, by blaming Pohl, falsely claiming that Pohl's actions in Utah had resulted in the
delays. The conspirators then conspired to convince the owner to modify the
specification which required the Pohl Euro-panel system, thereby allowing KCI to
breach its contract with T A B . , knowing that such action would result in T.A.B.
breaching its contract with Pohl. The conspirators would then be free to submit, as they
already had agreed to do, ISME's bid to build the inferior panel system, which could be
fabricated and installed with only a little further delay. The owners would thus be left
with the false impression that they had an inferior system due to delay by Pohl, rather
than the failures of Webelhuth, Bret and ISME. These plans were discussed by Bret
7

with Dennis, to get his specific approval. Dennis agreed to join the conspiracy and,
conscious of the wrongdoing Webelhuth, Bret, ISME and he were agreeing to engage
in, admonished Bret to start documenting everything.
On February 17, 2003, Webelhuth and Bret agreed that they would demand that
Pohl deliver the Euro-panel system on or before February 19, 2003, even though they
knew delivery by that date was impossible. Despite that knowledge, they agreed that
Bret would draft the demand letter, send the draft to T.A.B., and request T.A.B. to
finalize the demand letter and send it to Pohl, in Utah. Bret, in fact, drafted the agreed
upon demand letter and faxed it to T.A.B. T.A.B. then typed up the demand letter and,
in accordance with the request of Bret, faxed it to Pohl, in Utah. At the same time,
Webelhuth notified T.A.B. that KCI would terminate the contract with T.A.B. if the Europanel system was not delivered by February 19, 2003. Thus, T.A.B. purported to
terminate Pohl's contract as of the close of business February 19, 2003, based on the
same threat to T.A.B., by Webelhuth, to terminate T.A.B.'s contract if all panels were
not delivered by that date. However, Pohl's contract with T.A.B. contained no delivery
deadlines. Further, KCI had already missed its deadlines in its prime contract by fall,
2002, and had not provided verified field dimensions to Pohl. Thus, because the
verified field dimensions had not been provided to Pohl, it was impossible for Pohl to
complete the manufacture of the Euro-panel system.
Because of the conspirators' wrongful threats to T.A.B., and KCI's wrongful
breach of its contract with T.A.B., T.A.B. breached its contract with Pohl. Pohl sued
T.A.B. for such breach. T.A.B. counterclaimed, for itself and as a representative of
ISME. In the course of discovery in that action, Pohl discovered that T.A.B. was
incapable of responding in damages to Pohl's claim. Pohl ultimately agreed to dismiss
8

that case, without prejudice.
If the claims in this case were against T.A.B. for breach of contract, personal
jurisdiction would clearly exist in Utah. Because the claims are against parties who
conspired to cause T.A.B. to breach its contract with Pohl, the analysis is somewhat
more complex. However, the conspirators all transacted business with Pohl in Utah
with respect to the very T.A.B. contract that they later conspired to have T.A.B. breach,
and with respect to the prime contract that they conspired to cause the owner to
breach, requiring a Pohl system. The conspirators directed their tortious conduct
towards Pohl in Utah, by causing it to lose the economic benefit of its contract and
prospective economic advantage in Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

In response to the complaint, defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

The trial court found that the basis of the claims in the complaint was "that
Defendants caused TAB to breach its contract with Plaintiff by imposing impossible
scheduling requirements upon Plaintiff; and then terminating that contract due to
Plaintiffs failure to meet the schedule. In support of their position Plaintiff relies upon a
series of letters in February, 2003." R. 469-70. The trial court found "no nexus
between Defendants' contacts with Utah and Plaintiff's claims." R. 470. Finally, the trial
court determined that, with respect to the plaintiff's conspiracy claims, there was"no
basis for assertion of the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction over any of the
Defendants as there was no substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy performed
in the forum state." R. 470.
9

The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in a Memorandum
Decision, dated April 4, 2006. Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on April 27, 2006.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On March 27, 2000, KCI entered into a contract for the construction of a

Performing Arts Center at the University of Missouri in St. Louis, Missouri (the
"Project"). Webelhuth was the Project Manager. Webelhuth Affidavit, R. 43-44.
2.

Because the Project was a "public works" contract, the involvement of

businesses owned and operated by women and minorities was both encouraged and
required. Deposition of Anetta Vickers ("Vickers Dep.") at 23:13-24:2, R. 117-18.
3.

T.A.B. is a Missouri corporation, incorporated in October of 1998, and

owned at all relevant times by Anetta Vickers. Vickers Dep. at 10:6-22, R. 114.
4.

At some point, the University of St. Louis began advertising for bids for the

Project. The specifications for the Project required that a Pohl Euro-panel system be
used. Bret Miller Deposition ("Miller Dep."), taken May 20, 2004 ("Miller Dep.") at 13:312, R. 262. As a member of the Association of General Contractors, T.A.B. received
notice of the proposed Project and became aware that minority and women contractors
were being solicited to participate in the project. Vickers Dep. 23:13-24:2, R. 118-119.
T.A.B. qualifies as both a Minority Business Enterprise and as a Women's Business
Enterprise. Miller Dep. at 42:2-5, R. 278.
5.

T.A.B. was at that time involved with ISME in the construction of the St.

Louis Justice Center, and Ms. Vickers discussed with Bret the possibility of T.A.B.
participating with ISME in the Project. Vickers Dep. at 24:15-20, R. 118. ISME was
interested in becoming involved with T.A.B. on the Project because of T.A.B.'s minority
status. Bret told KCI about that benefit. Id. at 25:1-5, R. 119; Miller Dep. at 9:3 -10:4,
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15:17-24 R. 258-260.
6.

Bret contacted Pohl, in Utah, and requested, and obtained, a quote from

Pohl for the Euro-panel system. Miller Dep. at 27:14-24, R. 270.
7.

T.A.B. subsequently submitted a bid for the wall panels on the Project,

which bid included the quote Bret and ISME had obtained from Pohl. T.A.B. later
received a letter of intent from KCI, the project's general contractor, indicating that
aspect of the Project had been awarded to T.A.B. Id. 26:17-23, R. 269.
8.

Bret told Ms. Vickers to send Pohl a purchase order for the wall panels,

based on his preliminary work, and Ms. Vickers did so. Vickers Dep. 27:24-28:3, R.
120-121 and Deposition Exhibit 8, R. 339. Bret was the person who was in contact with
Pohl regarding the materials that were to be provided for the Project, and Ms. Vickers
relied upon Bret to make certain that Pohl provided materials that were consistent with
the Project specifications. Vickers Dep. 52:7-12, R. 130. When one of the Pohl
employees called Ms. Vickers with technical questions about the Project specifications,
Ms. Vickers simply referred him to Bret. Vickers Dep. 53:8-10 R. 131.
9.

When Ms. Vickers received correspondence from KCI, the general

contractor, regarding different issues relating to providing the wall panels for the
Project, Ms. Vickers forwarded those on to Bret to deal with. Vickers Dep. 57:1-12 R.
132. Ms. Vickers testified that it was her practice to forward all inquiries from Pohl
and/or KCI directly to Bret Miller and that she relied upon Bret 100 percent to handle
those concerns properly. Vickers Dep. 58:2-8 R. 133.
10.

KCI was obligated under the Prime Contract to "supply sufficient and

competent supervision and personnel, and sufficient material, plant, and equipment to
prosecute the Work with diligence to insure completion thereof within the time specified
11

in the Contract Documents, and [to] pay when due any laborer, Subcontractor of any
tier, or supplier." Prime Contract, § 3.4.1, R. 430. The Prime Contract went on to
require that KCI "shall give the Work an adequate amount of personal supervision, and
if a partnership or corporation or joint venture the Work shall be given an adequate
amount of personal supervision by a partner or executive officer. . .." Id. § 3.4.2. The
Prime Contract also stated: "The Contractor shall be represented at the Site by a
competent superintendent or foreman from the beginning of the Work until its final
acceptance, unless otherwise permitted by the Owner's Representative. The
superintendent or foreman for the Contractor for the general building Work shall
exercise general supervision over all Subcontractors of any tier engaged on the Work
with decision making authority of the Contractor." Id. § 3.4.3, R. 431. Finally, "[t]he
superintendent or foreman shall establish and maintain a permanent bench mark to
which access may be had during progress of the Work shall give all lines and levels,
and shall be responsible for the correctness of such." Id. § 3.4.3, R. 431.
11.

Webelhuth's admission that he was KCI's project manager, R. 43-44,

means that his personal supervision, individual competence and successful
performance were an express component of KCI's contract performance under the
provisions of the previous paragraph. It may reasonably be inferred, therefore, that if
serious problems arose in KCI's performance, due to Webelhuth's failure to adequately
supervise, to be competent and diligent and to assure that problems would not arise
due to non-payment by KCI to Pohl when Pohl's contract with T.A.B. required payment,
that Webelhuth would be placed in a precarious position with respect to his employment
at KCI.
12.

Throughout the term of the contract between T.A.B. and Pohl, Ms. Vickers

12

would receive information or an inquiry, pass it to Bret, and Bret would directly deal with
the issue or inform Ms. Vickers of how she should handle the matter.2 Moreover, Pohl
was aware that Bret was the person in charge of the T.A.B. contract in that it copied
Bret on every significant communication with Ms. Vickers.3 See Miller Dep. at 31:15-22,
43:5-13; 44:4-12 R. 272, 279, 280.
13.

Webelhuth knew that Pohl would be supplying the wall panels for the

Project. Deposition of Ronald J. Webelhuth ("Webelhuth Dep."), taken May 21, 2004,
at 8:24-9:4, R. 191-192, and 11:3-7, R. 194.
14.

The T.A.B. bid to KCI included the Pohl quote for the wall panels that Pohl

had provided to Bret in response to Bret's request. Webelhuth Dep. 9:7-12, R. 192195. Webelhuth included such Pohl quote in the KCI bid to the owner. Id. at 11:8-16,
R. 194.
15.

Webelhuth had conversations with Pohl employees and representatives

regarding details of the Pohl wall panels. Webelhuth Dep. 11:17 -12:23, R. 194-195.4
2

Ms. Vickers forwarded the KCI sub-contract for Bret's review and comment
and modified proposal based on Bret's suggestions (Vickers Dep. 62:14-24 and 63:1424, R. 137-138); request from KCI to Ms. Vickers for breakdown of contract amounts
and Bret's response (Vickers Dep. 59:12-60:24, R. 134-135 and Deposition Exhibit 10;
information sent from KCI to T.A.B. forwarded to Bret for his input and return to KCI
(Vickers Dep. 64:11 - 65:10, R. 139-140, and Deposition Exhibit 15). Ms. Vickers
testified that she typed Deposition Exhibit 38, R. 352, to fax to Pohl, based on
Deposition Exhibit 39, R. 353, the hand-written notes she received from Bret, notifying
Pohl that the materials would have to be delivered by February 19, 2003 or the contract
would be cancelled. Vickers Dep. at 128:22 -130:1, R. 157-189.
3

See Deposition Exhibit 28, 06/20/01 letter from Pohl to T.A.B. copied to Bret;
Deposition Exhibit 29, R. 344, copy of 06/28/01 letter from Pohl, Inc. to T.A.B. faxed to
Bret; Deposition Exhibit 30, R. 346, copy of 07/02/01 letter from Pohl to T.A.B. copied to
Bret.
4

"l had a couple phone conversations on questions along comments on the shop
drawings that came back from the architect or on specific details." Webelhuth Dep.
(continued...)
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16.

As was the case with Ms. Vickers, Webelhuth funneled most of his

communications to Pohl through Bret Miller. For example, in a letter to Pohl, dated July
7, 2001, Bret requested information from Pohl "[f]or the reference of Industrial Sheet
Metal and KCI Construction

" Deposition Exhibit 33, R. 350. In a letter dated

November 6, 2002 to Ms. Vickers, copied to Bret, Webelhuth complained he had not
been notified of a shipping date for support steel from Pohl and advised Ms. Vickers
that it was "imperative that Pohl provide the support steel now so installation can begin."
Deposition Exhibit 44, R. 356. On February 5, 2003, Bret faxed to Webelhuth a letter
he had received from Pohl, requesting that he, Webelhuth, "respond accordingly."
Deposition Exhibit 51, R. 362. As the Project manager, Webelhuth faxed Ms. Vickers a
letter, dated February 10, 2003, in which Webelhuth stated that he expected "Pohl to
add crews to the manufacturing process, work around the clock including week ends,
have outside suppliers make the support steel, have the painter work around the clock,
and ship everything by next day air freight to get the panels here to all installation to be
completed by the end of February 2003." Deposition Exhibit 53, R.366.
17.

When Pohl received field dimensions from any source for the project, the

information was reviewed, compiled and input into a form that could be used by Pohl
and its drafters. Deposition of Jason Summers, taken June 4, 2004 ("Summers Dep.")
at 35:15-23, R. 323.
18.

There were various transmittals of field dimensions from ISME to Pohl.

That information was used by Pohl in different ways, depending on the different areas
of the building. It was reviewed for resemblance of the field dimensions to the

(...continued)
11:21-23, R. 194.

14

architectural drawings, which were materially different. If the field dimensions did not
reflect the same information that was shown on the architectural drawings. Pohl would
interpret this information into new drawings, such as shop drawings, to get an
understanding of the complexity of the dimensions, how the dimensions varied panel to
panel, and how the information related to other parts that were interfacing. All this was
taken into account to understand what the dimensions needed to be and what they
should have been. If further information were needed, it would be forwarded back to
someone representing T.A.B. or ISME for follow-up information. It would later be
submitted to a drafter, and if the drafter had questions beyond that, more information
would be requested from T.A.B. and ISME. Then, if the engineers beyond that point
needed more information, additional requests for information were again submitted to
T.A.B. and ISME. Summers Dep. at 37:11-39:1, R. 324-326.
19.

There were panels which had been released for fabrication in October

2002 and could have been delivered in 16 weeks to the Project, but were not delivered
because modifications to the panels had to be made in the shop as a result of
inaccurate field information. Summers Dep. at 51:13 - 52:12.
20.

At the time Pohl became involved in the Project, it was the parties'

understanding and intent that the panels could be fabricated in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Due to changes by Bret and ISME in the production schedule, Pohl ultimately could not
fit the fabrication into its own production schedule, and so therefore had to contract with
its parent, Christian Pohl, GmbH, in Germany. Deposition of Dan Lossee, taken June
4, 2004 ("Lossee Dep.") at 11:14 -13:1, R. 330-332.
21.

Lehman Design & Concepts was the vendor Pohl used for drafting on this

project, which is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. Forsling Deposition, taken June 4,
15

2004 ("Forsling Dep.") at 9:24 -10:2, R. 336-337.
22.

By letter dated January 31, 2003, Bret advised Pohl that "[a]ll panels for

this project must be received by March 1, 2003 in order to allow ample time for
installation." Deposition Exhibit 48, R. 357. In a follow up letter to Pohl, dated February
2, 2003, Bret informed Pohl that "all material must be received by March 10, 2002 [sic]
for us to have a chance in meeting the schedule." Deposition Exhibit 49, R. 359.
23.

On February 14, 2003, counsel for Pohl wrote to Bret, advising him that

Pohl had not been paid in accordance with its contract with T.A.B. and discussing other
problems with the T.A.B. contract. See Deposition Exhibit 57, R. 372. Because Pohl
had not been paid in accordance with the contract, Pohl requested that payment be
made COD. Bret provided a copy of that letter to Webelhuth, and Webelhuth admitted
that he was upset by the COD requirement and other demands in that letter.
Webelhuth Dep. 27:16-28:10, R. 200-201.
24.

Shortly after receiving a copy of the letter from Pohl's counsel, Webelhuth

was approached by Bret about replacing Pohl as the supplier of metal panels on the
project. Bret told Webelhuth he knew of another panel system that could be used. Id.
at 30:13-24, R. 203.
25.

Thereafter, Webelhuth requested that Ms. Vickers come to the job site to

discuss the wall panels. At that meeting, Webelhuth gave Ms. Vickers a letter dated
February 17, 2003, in which he demanded that all metal panels be delivered within two
days, by February 19, 2003. Webelhuth Dep. 27:16-28:25, R. 200-201.
26.

Webelhuth relied upon Bret for his information regarding the status of

panel deliveries, but admitted that Ms. Vickers told him Pohl claimed it had not been
paid in conformity with its contract with T.A.B. Id. at 26:18 - 27:5, R. 199-200.
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Webelhuth disregarded Ms. Vickers' representations concerning lack of payment.
27.

The replacement for Pohl recommended by Bret was ISME, Dennis

Miller's company. Bret advised Webelhuth that ISME could obtain a panel material,
that he could manufacture the panels in his shop and install them to complete the
project on the time frame required. Webelhuth Dep. at 31:8-13, R. 204. At no time
after the two-day ultimatum letter was delivered to Ms. Vickers did Webelhuth look at or
consider any panel material other than that proposed by Bret. Id. 37:3-5, R. 210. Prior
to recommending the ISME replacement to the owners of the Project, Webelhuth did
not request an estimate from Brett. Id. 37:25 - 38:2 R. 210-211. ISME never provided
a bid for the wall panels and no written contract was entered intofor providing the
panels. Id. at 45:17-24, R. 218.
28.

Shortly before issuing the two-day ultimatum letter to T.A.B., Webelhuth

had discussions with Bret regarding the need to have Miller advise Pohl of Webelhuth's
need to have Pohl work overtime. Webelhuth Dep. at 78:22-79:5, R. 236-237 and
Deposition Exhibit 53, R. 366.5
29.

In response to Pohl's offer, Webelhuth told Bret that he would not approve

payment for the panels on a C.O.D. basis. Webelhuth Dep. at 87:5-13, R. 239; Vickers
Dep. at 136:15-137:17, R. 162-163. This is true even though the prime contract
imposed an obligation on KCI to pay Pohl. See paragraph 9, above (quoting Prime
Contract, § 3.4.1, R. 430) and Prime Contract, R. 434, § 3.7.9 ("Unless otherwise

5

Webelhuth's demand for Pohl was conveyed to Bret: "We expect Pohl to add
crews to the manufacturing process, work around the clock including week ends, have
outside suppliers make the support steel, have the painter work around the clock, and
ship everything by next day air freight to get the panels here to allow installation to be
completed by the end of February 2003."
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specifically noted, the Contractor shall provide and pay for supervision, labor, materials,
equipment tools, construction equipment arid machinery, water, heat, utilities,
transportation, and other facilities and services necessary for the proper execution and
completion of the Work.")
30.

After meeting with Webelhuth, and at Webelhuth's instruction, Bret hand-

wrote a letter to Pohl, demanding that Pohl deliver the Euro-panel system by February
19, 2003. Bret faxed the handwritten letter to Ms. Vickers on February 17, 2003
(Deposition Exhibit 39 R. 353-354), and requested that Ms. Vickers type the letter and
send it to Pohl. In accordance with the instructions received from Bret, Ms. Vickers
typed the letter and sent it to Pohl (Deposition Exhibit 38, R. 352). The letter advised
Pohl that all materials would have to be delivered by February 19, 2003, or the contract
(for the panels mandated by the Prime Contract) would be cancelled. Vickers Dep. at
128:22-130:1, R. 157-159; Miller Dep. at 59:16 - 60:2, R. 287-288. Prior to preparing
that handwritten document, Bret spoke with Webelhuth and prepared the document as
a result of that conversation and conclusions reached during that conversation. Miller
Dep., at 60:3-13, R. 288. According to Bret, Webelhuth wanted the letter sent so that
Pohl would send the materials. Miller Dep. at 61:1-6, R. 289.
31.

Bret's testimony regarding the intent of the letter is plainly false, and

evidences his consciousness of guilt, because Webelhuth admitted that, at the time he
gave T.A.B. the two-day ultimatum letter on February 17, 2003, Webelhuth was fully
aware that it was impossible for Pohl to provide the wall panels by the February 19,
2003 deadline. Id. at 100:18-101:5, R. 306-307 ("emphasis added). Webelhuth also
knew at that time that by refusing to have KCI pay Pohl COD, and instead terminating
T.A.B.'s contract, it would effectively remove Pohl from the project. Webelhuth Dep. at
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96:17-25, R. 301.
32.

Dennis Miller, the owner of ISME, which had already been put in place to

take over the provision of panels for the Prime Contract by virtue of Webelhuth and
Bret's misrepresentations to the Architect, issued a handwritten instruction to Bret,
advising him to "start compiling the paper trail and records (recalling) of phone
conversations." Deposition Exhibit 54, R. 370.
33.

Webelhuth plainly caused KCI not to pay Pohl as KCI was required to do

under the Prime Contract. Webelhuth's failure to competently supervise ISME and to
rely instead on Bret, resulted in a situation where the panels required by the
specifications could not be delivered in a time frame that Webelhuth desired, even
where Pohl hired Christian Pohl to assist it. To cover-up his own incompetence, both to
KCI and the Owner, Webelhuth plainly conspired to blame Pohl for the situation by
representing to the Owner that Pohl had caused delay. Webelhuth thus caused the
Owner to accept the non-conforming panels ISME agreed to provide in furtherance of
the conspiracy, caused KCI to breach its obligation to pay Pohl under the Prime
Contract and caused T.A.B. to breach its contract with Pohl, sending the termination
letter to Utah.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court concluded from the written submissions that "Defendants lack the
substantial and continual contacts with Utah required for general personal jurisdiction
and in light of the aforementioned . . . Defendants also lack the "minimum contacts"
required to satisfy the due process requirements of specific personal jurisdiction.
The trial court failed, however, to apply the proper analysis to determine whether
defendants' contacts with Utah allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them in
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Utah. In the course of Webelhuth, Bret and ISME's continuous dealings with Pohl
concerning Pohrs performance under the T A B . contract, all of which was in
furtherance of those defendants' own duties under their respective contracts pertaining
to the Project, they induced Pohl to incur economic obligations, to hire its own
subcontractors and suppliers, in Germany and in Salt Lake City.
Once Webelhuth realized that he had failed in his duties to competently
supervise the receipt of the Euro-panel system panels, Webelhuth, Bret, Dennis and
ISME entered into a conspiracy designed specifically to injure Pohl, in Utah, to get rid of
Pohl, to terminate Pohl's contract with T.A.B. and to induce the Owner to allow a
substitution of the previously-mandated Pohl Euro-panel system. The conspirators
specifically intended to cause economic injury to Pohl in Utah by their conspiracy and
did cause injury to Pohl in Utah, since Pohl had incurred large obligations to others in
attempting to meet the demands of Webelhuth and ISME in performing on its contract
with T.A.B.
Because the conspirators, through their conduct in Missouri, specifically intended
to cause and did cause economic injury to Pohl in Utah, they committed a tort within
Utah sufficient to satisfy both Utah's long arm statute and the requirements of due
process. Moreover, the substantial contacts that the defendants had with Utah, and
specifically, Pohl, involved the transaction of business in Utah concerning Pohl's
contract with T.A.B. While defendants argue that their tortious conduct was not related
to their prior transaction of business with respect to the Pohl/T.A.B. contract, they
ignore the fundamental connections between such transaction of business and the
injuries they caused through their torts. Had Pohl's quote not been solicited by Bret and
ISME, had Webelhuth not included Pohl's quote in KCI's bid, and had both Bret and
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Webelhuth not made demands on Pohl that caused it to incur obligations to other
contractors, Pohl never could have been injured by the torts. Instead, Pohl's injuries
from the tortious conduct are directly related to defendants' transaction of business with
Pohl, in Utah.
ARGUMENT
I.

A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, TAKING ALL FACTS AS TRUE AND
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF FINDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION, IS THE
STANDARD AT THIS STAGE OF THE LITIGATION.

In Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8, 137 P.3d 706, the Utah
Supreme Court stated the appellate Court's responsibility to "accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id., U 2, 137
P.3d at 708. In addition, in determining the existence of jurisdiction for purposes of a
pre-trial motion, all of the factual allegations of the plaintiff in the record, whether in
unverified pleadings or in affidavits or other documents, must be accepted as true. See
Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, U 3, 8 P.3d 256, 258 n.1 ("The
facts are drawn from the trial court's record, including the unverified complaint and the
affidavits . . . . Therefore, "[t]he plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true
unless specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions, but any
disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs favor.")
In addition to deeming all such facts to be true, the Court is required "to consider
[them] in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. . . ."6 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). Finally, such facts, favorably considered, need make

6

As such, plaintiff argues herein the facts and reasonable inferences favorably
drawn from those facts.
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only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, 1j
12, 980 P.2d 204, 207-08 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff made
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction); accord Lee v. Frank's Garage & Used
Cars, Inc., 2004 UT App 260, U 2, 97 P.3d 717, 719 n.2 ("When personal jurisdiction is
determined solely on the parties' affidavits, the plaintiff must only make a prima facie
showing.")
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT
FELL WITHIN UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE.

A.

Defendants All Conspired to and Did Tortiously Cause Injury to Pohl
in Utah.

In Fenn, 2006 UT 8, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that where, as here,
plaintiff "relies on specific jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is only proper if we
determine that (1) the Utah long-arm statute extends to defendant's acts or contacts, (2)
plaintiffs claim arises out of those acts or contacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction
satisfies the defendant's right to due process under the United States Constitution."
Fenn, U 8, 137 P.3d at 710. Further, tortious conduct causing injury in Utah has been
expressly included in the Utah long-arm statute as conduct that allows the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over defendants, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(3).
Here, each of the defendants is charged with conspiring to commit tortious
interference that caused Pohl to be injured in Utah. The facts amply show injury within
the state arising out of the conspiracy's acts or conduct. First, Pohl's exclusive place of
business is in Utah. When the Owner required a Euro-panel System for its building, it
necessarily required its prime contractor to contract with Pohl in Utah, or to have a
subcontractor do so. All persons working under the prime contract therefore had
knowledge of the necessity of a Utah contract with Pohl. Second, in the conduct of
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their own contractual obligations, Webelhuth, on behalf of KCI and Bret, on behalf of
KCI, T A B . and ISME, made demands on Pohl to commence fabrication of panels
when Pohl did not have an available production window. Bret and ISME had
specifically solicited Pohl's original quote and Bret advised T.A.B. concerning the
purchase order it sent to Pohl. Webelhuth included Pohl's quote in KCI's successful bid
for the project.
Thus the defendants were responsible for engaging Pohl to begin with.
Moreover, in seeking to fulfill its contract with T.A.B., Pohl was required to contract with
its German parent, Christian Pohl, GmbH, to attempt to comply with the demands of
Webelhuth, Bret and ISME, and did so. Pohl also supplied air freight from Germany to
accommodate the demands of Webelhuth, Bret and ISME. When requested by Bret to
provide an estimated delivery schedule for Webelhuth, Pohl did so.
When Webelhuth became upset with Pohl's proposed schedule, likely because it
made him look bad to the owner, he hatched a scheme to cover-up his failures by
blaming, and retaliating against, Pohl. This is the first foray into the conspiracy to
commit torts against Pohl, but it directly arises out of the pre-existing business
relationship. Webelhuth realized that he had to convince the owner to alter the
mandatory Prime Contract specification that a Pohl Euro-panel system be used. As a
necessary step in the plot to tortiously interfere with Pohl, plaintiff contends, Webelhuth
misrepresented to the owner that delays in the procurement of the panels were caused
by Pohl, which was untrue. Rather the delays were due to Webelhuth's own lack of
competence in both understanding the Euro-panel system and its fabrication
requirements, and due to his failure to supervise the T.A.B. contract and to make sure
that Pohl had been timely paid thereunder, both of which were his express
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responsibilities under the Prime Contract. Webelhuth then placed an impossible and
arbitrary deadline upon T.A.B. to deliver the panels. Webelhuth also had Bret draft a
letter for T.A.B. to send to Pohl terminating its contract. Webelhuth's motive to commit
the torts was to cover-up his own incompetence and for the malicious purpose of
punishing Pohl for demanding COD payment of goods after the terms of its credit
agreement with T.A.B. had been breached. Moreover, Webelhuth knew that Pohl had
been required, based on his own demands, to assume contractual liabilities to others,
which Pohl would have to pay regardless of the breach.
Pohl therefore suffered by reducing its margin in response to the demands it
received, and not only losing its remaining profit, but also losing the ability to be
reimbursed for monies it had to pay to vendors in furtherance of responding to
Webelhuth's, Bret's and ISME's demands to Pohl in the performance of Pohl's contract
with T.A.B. The full injury caused to Pohl by defendants was intended to be felt in Utah
and the long-arm statute expressly, therefore, authorizes personal jurisdiction over
defendants.
In Pure, Ltd. v. Shasta Beverages, Inc., 691 F. Supp 1274 (D. Haw. 1988), in
interpreting Hawaii's virtually identical tortious injury provision in that state's long-arm
statute, the Court stated:
The complaint alleges interference by National with the Agreement
between Shasta and Pure which has allegedly resulted in economic
injuries to Pure. These economic injuries include damages and
expenditures it incurred in Hawaii by drilling a water well on the
Island of Hawaii, contracting for flexible tanks to transport the water
from the Island of Hawaii to Shasta's continental U.S. bottling
facilities, design of the labels and containers for the products to
have been bottled and sold by Shasta under the Agreement, and
the loss of royalty payments that it would have received in Hawaii
had Shasta performed. The complaint alleges that Pure's injury
occurred in Hawaii, as the result of National's alleged tortious acts.
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Therefore, the court finds that Pure has alleged tortious acts by
National, which for the purposes of this motion National does not
contest, sufficient to subject National to the jurisdiction of this court
pursuant to HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35(a)(2).
Id. at 1277-78. Thus, the allegation of a tort committed outside the jurisdiction that was
intended to cause injury within the jurisdiction was sufficient. Accord Shaw v. North
American Title, 76 Hawaii 323, 876 P.2d 1291 (1994)("Shaw's intentional tort
allegations are significant. Applying the "effects" test here and assuming the truth of
his complaint and affidavit, Shaw has demonstrated that: (1) NATCO "targeted" Shaw
in Hawai'i when it allegedly committed fraud and misrepresentation by agreeing to
forward his creditors' checks to him and then, without giving Shaw notice, closed his
trust account only two months after issuing the checks, thereby rendering the checks
worthless; and (2) NATCO arguably "targeted" Shaw in Hawai'i when it reissued
checks directly to Shaw's creditors (against Shaw's specific instructions) rather than
giving the reissued checks to Shaw.")
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit likewise has
recognized that "inducing the customers of an Illinois firm to drop their orders can be a
tort in Illinois—and given 735 ILCS 5 /2- 209(c), whether or not it is a tort in Illinois, it is
actionable in Illinois." Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200,1203 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, the trial court found that the fact that the conspirators caused T.A.B. to
send its letter terminating Pohl's contract, rather than sending a communication
themselves, was fatal to personal jurisdiction. However, there is no question that
Webelhuth and Bret agreed to have Bret write the letter for T.A.B. to send to Pohl,
which letter Bret in fact wrote, after Webelhuth and Bret convinced the Owner to
change the specifications. Bret and Webelhuth plainly caused the letter to be sent into
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Utah, and most importantly plainly injured Pohl in Utah.
The sole remaining inquiry is whether an exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
comports with the requirements of sue process, discussed in Part II, below.
B.

Defendants Also Transacted Business Within Utah.

Defendants, through the discharge of the contractual obligations ISME and KCI
had, were required to transact business with Pohl in Utah, to procure the Euro-panel
system that the prime contract required to be installed on the project. Bret and ISME
admitted their numerous letters and faxes to Pohl, in addition to telephone calls, in their
role as project manager for T.A.B. Indeed, T.A.B.'s principal testified that she relied
"100 %" on Bret and ISME to transact such business and assure that the panels would
be procured. Webelhuth used Bret and ISME to transmit his own messages to Pohl
concerning the panel system, at one time going so far as to demand that Pohl work
overtime or do whatever it takes to deliver the panels when Webelhuth wanted them.
Webelhuth had a role defined by the Prime Contract that required him to deal with Pohl
in Utah, directly and, by use of Bret as his representative, indirectly.
Pohl did not seek out these business contacts from Bret, ISME or Webelhuth.
They occurred for one simple reason- the Prime Contract required Pohl's Euro-panel
system and therefore required all of the contractors working on the Project to transact
business with Pohl to the extent they intended to perform their own contractual
obligations on the Project.
The "transaction of any business within [Utah,]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(1),
is thus the second express basis under the Utah long-arm statute to assert jurisdiction
over defendants. That defendants did not, themselves, contract directly with Pohl to
have Pohl supply panels directly to them does not mandate a conclusion that they did
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not transact any business in Utah. To the contrary, the Utah legislature expressly and
broadly defined what the "transaction of business" means, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2723, as "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state,
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah." Id. (emphasis added). It
is undeniable that Pohl was "affected" by the communications to it from Bret and ISME,
both in behalf of themselves and T.A.B., and also when Webelhuth used Bret and ISME
as his messenger to Pohl. Bret, ISME and Webelhuth each exhorted Pohl to hurry its
fabrication and delivery of panels. For example, when Webelhuth demanded that
panels be fabricated during a time frame when Pohl could not schedule the fabrication
to occur in Pohl's Salt Lake City plant, Pohl accommodated such demand by entering
into a contract with its parent company in Germany, Christian Pohl, GmbH, to do the
fabrication work. Pohl even arranged for air freight from Germany. Pohl's own
anticipated margins under its existing contract with T.A.B were affected by these
demands from Bret, ISME and Webelhuth.
Further, the trial court ignored the Utah Supreme Court's position that the
purposeful direction of business communications toward Utah qualifies as the
transaction of business within Utah. In Sll MegaDiamond, Inc. v. American
Superabraisives Corp., 2000 UT 71, 969 P.2d 430, the Utah Supreme Court precisely
stated the issue before it: "In this case, however, we are asked to determine whether
business conducted exclusively through remote means can qualify as 'transaction of
any business within this state."' Id. at 433. The Utah Supreme Court adopted the
following rule from Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985):
[l]t is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a
substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and
wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for
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physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.
So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed"
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected
the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
personal jurisdiction there.
Sll MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 434-35. The Court then held that the defendant, even
though transacting business remotely, "transacted business within [Utah.]" Id.
That rule clearly applies in this case. The Owner's Project specifications
required its prime contractor to procure a Pohl Euro-panel system and therefore
required that Webelhuth, as project manager, arrange to do business with Pohl in Utah.
It also thus required that Bret and ISME, as installers and project managers for T.A.B.,
continuously interact with Pohl to the end of procuring such system. Even before
T.A.B. entered into its contract with Pohl, Bret and ISME had already made the initial
contact with Pohl, in Utah, to obtain a quote for Pohl's Euro-panel system. Bret and
ISME assisted T.A.B. in preparing a purchase order to be sent to Pohl for such system.
Bret and ISME, as T.A.B.'s project manager, had numerous telephone, fax and mail
contacts with Pohl, which contacts were designed to procure the Pohl Euro-panel
system from Pohl. There is no question that Bret and ISME affirmatively sought out
Pohl and transacted business with it in Utah to the end of procuring the Pohl Euro-panel
system.
When Webelhuth prepared KCI's bid to the Owner, Webelhuth specifically
included Pohl's quote in the KCI bid. Once KCI had the contract, it was under an
affirmative contractual duty to the owner to procure and install the Pohl Euro-panel
system. T.A.B. had the contractual relationship with Pohl, but Webelhuth, as KCI's
project manager, used each of T.A.B., Bret and ISME as representatives in procuring
the system KCI was contractually bound to install. Webelhuth received numerous
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communications from Bret and ISME about Pohl's progress and worked with Bret and
ISME to transmit Webelhuth's desires on timing to Pohl.
The fact that Webelhuth used T.A.B., Bret and ISME to procure the Pohl Europanel system in order to discharge his duties to KCI as its project manger does not
insulate him from the acts of those representatives. The case of Gelfand v. Tanner
Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967) is instructive. There, the foreign
corporation defendant contracted with an independent contractor to conduct sales in
New York. See id. at 118-19. In holding that the transaction of business by an
independent contractor sufficed, under the facts of that case, to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation, the court found dispositive the fact that "these
services [performed by the independent contractor] are sufficiently important to the
foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the
corporation's own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services."
Id. at 121. Since Webelhuth, as KCI project manager, would have had to transact
business in Utah with Pohl, as Bret and ISME did, had T.A.B., Bret and ISME not done
so, in order to fulfill KCI's contractual obligation to the owner to provide a Pohl Europanel System, the transaction of business by Bret and ISME suffices to hold that
Webelhuth transacted business in Utah.
That ruling is also in accord with the Utah Supreme Court's precedent of Ted R.
Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378 (Utah 1980). In holding that
the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme Court there
stated: "Although Carnes directly employs no personnel in the State of Utah it does
effectuate the sale of its equipment through the efforts of local representatives bound to
Carnes by a contractual commitment." Id. at 381. The Court continued: "The efforts of
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the various sales representatives, such as Brown, are so intricately related to the
actual contracting that any claim concerning such efforts must be considered as
arising out of that activity" Id. (emphasis added). Here, all of the solicitation of goods
from Pohl, by T.A.B., Bret and ISME, was integrally related to the contractual obligation
of KCI, and Webelhuth's duty as project manager to meet that obligation, to procure
Pohl's Euro-panel system in accordance with the contract between KCI and the Owner.
The contacts all arise out of Webelhuth's demands, conveyed by Bret and ISME,
concerning the timing of fabrication of the panels and of delivery. The contention by
defendants that they did not transact business in Utah, when they were required to do
so by the terms of their own Project contracts and duties, is thus unsustainable.
Finally, the trial court erroneously determined that "the only communication with
Plaintiff that is a necessary part of Plaintiff's claims is the TAB February 17, 2003 letter.
As to the Defendants named in this lawsuit, however, the only actions or conduct by
them that form the basis for Plaintiffs claims were performed exclusively in the State of
Missouri-with persons or entities located in the state of Missouri. Based upon the
forgoing, the Court can find no nexus between Defendants' contacts with Utah and
Plaintiff's claims." As was shown above, the T.A.B. February 17, 2003 letter was
caused to be sent by defendants- indeed, Bret wrote the letter. Most significantly,
however, without the defendants' prior transaction of business with Pohl in Utah, there
would have been no contracts to interfere with. Indeed, Webelhuth's motivation was to
hide his own incompetence in dealing with Pohl during the transaction of business by
blaming Pohl for delays in the Project. True, the transaction of business pleaded does
not give rise to a breach of contract claim against defendants. But defendants'
transaction of business in Utah gave rise to the situation motivating their torts and
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causing injury in Utah. Without the prior transaction of business there would have been
no torts committed by these defendants and no injuries sustained by Pohl in obligating
itself to others on its subcontracts. Therefore, the tort claims "arise from" the prior
transaction of business even though the transaction of business was itself actionable
and would not have resulted in injury without the tortious conduct, as well.
III.

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS IS NOT OFFENDED B Y ALLOWING POHL A UTAH FORUM.

Utah courts follow a four-part test to determine whether federal due process is
offended by an exercise of personal jurisdiction and that such four-part test is set forth
has been set forth as follows:
Consequently, defendant must have [1]" 'purposefully avail[ed]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' [citations
omitted]. [2] Specific personal jurisdiction "may be asserted ...
'only on claims arising out of defendant's forum-state activity,'"
[citations omitted], and [3] the connection between the defendant
and the forum state must be such that the defendant" 'should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" [citations
omitted]. Finally, [4] "the determination of whether Utah can justify
asserting jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of
the fairness to the parties and the interests of the State in
assuming jurisdiction." [citations omitted].
Sll MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 435. In reaching its conclusion that "defendants also
lack the 'minimum contacts' required to satisfy the due process requirements of specific
personal jurisdiction" (R. 470), the trial court adopted the defendants' oversimplified
analysis of the facts of this case in applying the four-part test enunciated by the Utah
Supreme Court.
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A.

Defendants' Purposeful Availment.

"Physical contact with the forum state is not a necessary condition, 'within the
rubric of purposeful availment, the [Supreme] Court has allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant whose only "contact" with the forum state is the
"purposeful direction" of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.'" Harris Rutsky &
Co. Insurance Services, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Limited, 328 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). "The purposeful availment requirement is met if the
defendant 'performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the
transaction of business within the forum state."' Id. (citations omitted).
The trial court's finding that defendants lacked significant minimum contacts with
Utah is at odds with (a) the admissions by Bret that he and ISME solicited the original
quote from Pohl, (b) Ms. Vickers' testimony that Bret instructed her to send a purchase
order to Pohl and that she relied on Bret "100 %" to deal with Pohl, (c) Bret's own
admission that he directed the coordination of effort with Pohl to procure panels, and (d)
the fact that Bret drafted the letter which T.A.B. sent to Pohl, in Utah, notifying Pohl that
T.A.B. was terminating its contract with Pohl. Further, since the extensive transaction
of business with Pohl was directly related to the procurement of panels for the Project,
those contacts necessarily relate to the claim of Pohl that these defendants interfered
with that very contract, regardless of whether those contacts, themselves, constitute the
tortious act of interference.
The trial court's finding that the defendants' "only actions or conduct by them that
form the basis for Plaintiff's claims were performed exclusively in the State of
Missouri-with persons or entities located in the state of Missouri" (R. 470) is likewise at
odds with Webelhuth's admission that he included the Pohl quote in KCI's bid on the
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project and, thereafter, that he plainly communicated his demands to Pohl for
performance through Bret. Since Webelhuth's plot to interfere was motivated, on his
part, to cover-up his failure to properly interact, whether through Bret or directly, with
Pohl, concerning the progress of the contractually-required Pohl Euro-panel system, his
entire conduct in interacting with Pohl, through Bret, is part of the claim of interference.
Moreover, Webelhuth's conduct in February, 2003, in handing out an impossible
deadline that pre-dated by almost one month prior deadlines approved by him, is
evidence that his state of mind was to blame Pohl for his project failures.
Webelhuth demanded changes to the Pohl contract and Bret and ISME actively
caused those changes to be made. It is immaterial that T.A.B. was contractually on the
hook to pay Pohl, when Webelhuth, Bret and ISME were directing Pohl's actual conduct
within Utah toward supplying them the panels they had to have to meet their own
contractual obligations.
Dennis, who joined the conspiracy when he authorized ISME's participation and
directed Bret to start making a paper trail, has imputed to him the contacts of his coconspirators. "The 'conspiracy theory' of personal jurisdiction is based on the 'time
honored notion that the acts of [a] conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be
attributed to the other members of the conspiracy."1 Textor v. Board of Regents of
Northern Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir. 1983). Against this backdrop,
there is simply no support for the trial court's finding that "there is no basis for assertion
of the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants as there
was no substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy performed in the forum state."
R. 470.
Finally, defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and
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protections of Utah law when they intentionally reached out to cause injury within Utah
by their tortious acts. They are protected by Utah law on tortious interference, of which
they availed themselves when they chose to cause injury here. Like the United States
Supreme Court said: "An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek
redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in
California." Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). Such conclusion is also
supported by Harris Rutsky & Co., supra. In Harris Rusky, the Court identified the
question before it: "We are asked to decide whether a federal district court in California
can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over London, England-based entities alleged
to have interfered with a California corporation's contractual and business relations by
their actions in Europe." 328 F.3d at 1127. The Court answered that question in the
affirmative, stating:
First, B & C is alleged to have committed an intentional
tort-interference in ASR's contractual and economic relationships,
[citation omitted] Second, B & C knew, of course, that ASR was a
California resident, and so the alleged acts were expressly aimed
at ASR-a California resident, [citation omitted]. Third, ASR is a
California corporation whose principal place of business is in
California, and the brunt of the harm was therefore felt in California,
[citation omitted] In sum, under our precedents the facts alleged
here are more than sufficient to satisfy the "effects" test.
Id. at 1131.
In discussing ways to meet the "purposeful availment" prong, the Utah Supreme
Court specifically recognized that the causing of injury within the state is one method of
meeting this prong:
In applying the Calder test, the court examines the degree to which
defendants knew or should have known that their actions may
affect a given plaintiff in the forum. The defendants in Calder were
not intending to avail themselves specifically of the benefits of
conducting business in California. But the court concluded that
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because they had knowledge that their defamatory acts could
injure a particular California-based company, California courts
could properly exercise jurisdiction. Likewise, in applying the
"effects test" to Internet activity, the Ninth Circuit, in Panavision
International v. Toeppen, concluded that California may exercise
personal jurisdiction over an Illinois defendant who registered other
companies' trademarks as Internet domain names with the
intention of later selling those domain names to the trademark
owners. Because Panavision was headquartered in California, the
court determined that the defendant must have known his actions
would have the effect of injuring the plaintiff in California.
Fenn, 2006 UT 8 at H 14, 137 P.3d at 712 (footnotes omitted). Plaintiff has pleaded
here, and the documentary record establishes, that defendants knew full well that their
torts would cause injury in Utah.
B.

Defendants' Forum-State Activity.

The myriad of direct communications and contacts by Bret and ISME with Pohl,
in Utah, including without limitation, specific directions to Pohl as to when to fabricate,
requiring Pohl to subcontract out fabrication, how to ship, i.e. air freight from Germany,
and when to deliver, are communications that constitute forum-state activity even
though there is no physical presence in the state. See Sll MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at
434-35 (even though transacting business remotely, defendant "transacted business
within [Utah.]") Moreover, as explained above, the fact that Webelhuth used Bret as his
messenger does not serve to insulate Webelhuth from the contacts and demands he
caused Bret to make to Pohl in Utah.
Further, the defendants, specifically, encouraged Pohl to move forward. When
the defendants caused the Owner to change the specifications and T.A.B. to breach its
contract with Pohl, it was with the specific intent and knowledge that all of Pohl's work
that they had solicited, all of the work Pohl had undertaken, and all of the expense Pohl
had obligated itself to pay in furtherance of that transaction of business would be for
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naught, and that Pohl would thereby be injured. The devastating effect of the
defendants' tortious conduct was designed to injure Pohl in Utah, and it did. Since the
tortious conduct of defendants was intentional and expressly aimed at Pohl in Utah, the
presence of defendants in Utah is measured by the effects of their tortious conduct.
See Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) ("[Petitioners are not charged with
mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions
were expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited
an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent.
And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in
which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.
Under the circumstances, petitioners must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there" to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article.")
Likewise, specifically in the context of tortious interference, the Harris Rusky
Court answered the same way: "B & C had ongoing contacts with the forum state over a
four-year period, and its alleged tortious conduct in London had the effect of injuring
ASR in California. But for B & C's conduct, this injury would not have occurred. We are
satisfied that ASR's claims arise out of B & C's California related activities." 328 F.3d at
1132.
The district court's finding that there was no forum state activity by defendants is
plainly wrong under the applicable law.
C.

Defendants Could Reasonably Foresee Being Sued in Utah.

Bret and ISME first approached Pohl for a quote in February, 2000. Bret and
ISME later induced T.A.B. to enter into a contract with Pohl based on that quote. Bret
and ISME knew that T.A.B. was not in fact a contracting company, but existed solely to
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facilitate them in their need to meet WBE/MBE quotas for this public works project.
Webelhuth knew that as well, as is evidenced by the fact that almost all his dealings
concerning T.A.B.'s contract with Pohl were through Bret, not T.A.B. Webelhuth also
knew that Pohl's bid was placed into the bid he prepared and submitted to the Owner.
When Webelhuth, Bret, Dennis and ISME came up with their plan to cause the
Owner to approve a contract change to eliminate the requirement of a Pohl Euro-panel
system, they knew it would have a negative impact on Pohl, in Utah. After all, much of
the liability Pohl had incurred was due directly to demands from Webelhuth, through
Bret. So when they schemed to have ISME take over the contract from Pohl, they
could well-anticipate that they would have to answer for their misconduct in a Utah
courtroom. So apparent was this fact to ISME's president, Dennis Miller, that he saw a
need to specifically instruct Bret to "start compiling the paper trail" when he personally
approved the scheme on behalf of ISME.
Webelhuth's malice towards Pohl was so transparent that he arbitrarily imposed
a deadline for performance by Pohl that (1) he knew when he imposed it was
impossible to meet; and (2) was almost one month earlier than prior deadlines sought
to be imposed that he had approved. Further, it may reasonably be inferred from the
circumstantial evidence during the first two weeks of February that Webelhuth's sudden
demand to meet with T.A.B.'s president, Vickers, prior to making that impossible
demand, and prior to meeting with the Owner, was to ensure that Vickers would be on
the same page as Bret, ISME and Webelhuth in attempting to blame Pohl for the delay,
rather than them. This pre-tortious interference effort to speak with one voice speaks
volumes about whether Webelhuth expected to get sued in Utah by Pohl.
No reasonable person could seek Pohl out in Utah to engage Pohl in such
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significant business activity, then make demands on Pohl to the extent that Pohl was
required to hire other companies in and out of Utah to help it meet those demands, and
then, when upset by Pohl, deliberately and knowingly wreak economic destruction on
Pohl in Utah by destroying its economic advantage, without expecting to be sued in
Utah. Under the Ca/afer "effects" test, as shown in the cases cited, the foregoing truism
has been recognized. Defendants could plainly foresee being haled into court Utah.
D.

Utah's Interest In Providing A Forum Is Strong.

Utah's interest in providing an effective forum for Pohl is so strong that it has
been eloquently expressed in the form of a legislative finding and directive:
"the public interest demands the state provide its citizens with an
effective means of redress against nonresident persons, who,
through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This
legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological
progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce
between the several states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to
the citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-22. Here, the defendants each deliberately intended to

further their own economic well-being by affirmatively consenting to build a building in
which the goods supplied by a Utah company were mandated by the very contract
entered into by KCI. The defendants then transacted business with Pohl, in Utah, for
over a two-year period of time, in order to enhance their own economic well-being.
Pohl relied in good faith on the defendants' unreasonable demands in, itself, working
under its contract with T.A.B., a company known to defendants to be involved solely
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because of its MBE/WBE benefits, from the outset. Pohl entered into contracts with
other Utah residents to meet those demands. The defendants then capped their
scheme through their underhanded and malicious conduct of causing the Owner to
change its contract specifications by falsely blaming Pohl for delay, and then giving all
the economic benefit that should have inured to Pohl, in Utah, instead to ISME.
Where Pohl is a Utah company, defendants engaged in numerous contacts with
Pohl in Utah, defendants caused harm to Pohl in Utah, and the contract with which
defendants deliberately interfered was to be performed in Utah, the State of Utah has a
strong interest in providing a forum in which Pohl can seek redress for the harm
intentionally inflicted on it by the defendants.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision should be reversed and
the case remanded to have a schedule entered, discovery conducted and to proceed
towards trial.
DATED
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day of September, 2006.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE QF-42TAK

POHL, INC. OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.

Case No. 050908318

RON WEBELHUTH; BRET MILLER;
DENNIS MILLER; INDUSTRIAL, SHEET
METAL ERECTORS, INC.; AND' JOHN
DOES 1 THROUGH X,

Hon. Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
April 3, 2006

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction.

The

Court heard oral argument with respect to the motion on March 13,
2006.

Following the hearing, the matter was taken under

advisement.
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
With this motion, Defendants assert they have insufficient
contacts with Utah for a Utah court to exercise jurisdiction.
Specifically, Defendants argue they lack the substantial and
continual contacts in Utah required for general personal
jurisdiction.

Moreover, contend Defendants, they lack the

"minimum contacts" required to satisfy the due process
requirements of specific personal jurisdiction.

According to
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Defendants, any alleged "tortious" act would have occurred
exclusively in Missouri.
In light of the aforementioned, Defendants contend Utah
lacks personal jurisdiction and this case should be dismissed
with prejudice and fees granted.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Defendants transacted
business in Utah as the prime contract required Pohl's Euro-panel
System and, therefore, required all of the contractors working on
the project to transact business with Pohl (a Utah company) to
the extent they intended to perform their own contractual
obligations on the project.

Moreover, argues Plaintiff,

Defendants all conspired to and did tortiously cause injury to
Pohl in Utah

Indeed, contends Plaintiff, Pohl's exclusive place

of business is in Utah, consequently, when the owner required a
Euro-panel System for its building, it necessarily required its
prime contractor to contract with Pohl in Utah or to have a
subcontractor do so.
Further, asserts Plaintiff, in the conduct of their own
contractual obligations, Webelhuth, on behalf of KCI, and Bret,
on behalf of KCI, T.A.B. and ISME, made demands on Pohl to
commence fabrication when it did not have an available production
window.

Indeed, argues Plaintiff, Pohl, based upon the demands

of Defendants, was forced to assume contractual liabilities to
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others, which Pohl had to pay regardless of the breach.
Additionally, contends Plaintiff, Defendants purposefully
availed themselves of the benefits and protections of Utah law.
They accomplished this, asserts Plaintiff, via their extensive
transaction of business with Pohl, which was direcjtly related to
the procurement of panels for the building and those contacts
necessarily relate to the claim of Pohl that these Defendants
interfered with that very contract, regardless of whether those
contacts, themselves, constitute the tortious act of
interference.

Moreover, argues Plaintiff, the myriad of direct

communications and contacts by Bret and ISME with Pohl, in Utah,
constitute forum-state activity and as a result of their actions,
Defendants could reasonably foresee being sued in Utah.

Finally,

in light of the aforementioned, it is Plaintiff's position Utah's
interest in providing a forum is strong
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26 ( Jurisdiction over nonresidents)
provides that u[o]nly claims arising from acts enumerated herein
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which
jurisdiction over him is based upon this act.".

Id.

Having considered Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court finds the
basis of all of the Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants caused
TAB to breach its contract with Plaintiff by imposing impossible
scheduling requirements upon Plaintiff; and then terminating that
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contract due to Plaintiffs failure to meet the schedule.

In

support of their position Plaintiff relies upon a series of
letters in February, 2003.
After reviewing the letters and communications at issue, it
is clear the only communication with Plaintiff that is a
necessary part of Plaintiff's claims is the TAB February 17th
letter.

As to the Defendants named in this lawsuit, however, the

only actions or conduct by them that form the basis for
Plaintiff's claims were performed exclusively in the State of
Missouri-with persons or entities located in the state of
Missouri.

Based upon the forgoing, the Court can find no nexus

between Defendants' contacts with Utah and Plaintiff's claims.
Finally, there is no basis for assertion of the conspiracy
theory of personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants as
there was no substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy
performed in the forum state.
In sum, Defendants lack the substantial and continual
contacts with Utah required for general personal jurisdiction and
in light of the aforementioned, the Court is persuaded Defendants
also lack the "minimum contacts" required to satisfy the due
process requirements of specific personal jurisdiction.
Based upon the forging, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
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As for Defendants' request for

fees, the Court does not find Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous,
nor were they asserted in bad faith. Accordingly, fees are not
warranted and Defendants' request is, respectfully, denied.
DATED this p

day of April, 2006.
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